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Abstract
Relying on Michigan Survey￿monthly micro data on in￿ ation expectations
we try to determine the main features ￿in terms of sources and degree of hetero-
geneity - of in￿ ation expectation formation over di⁄erent phases of the business
cycle and for di⁄erent demographic subgroups. We identify three regions of the
overall distribution corresponding to di⁄erent expectation formation processes,
which display a heterogeneous response to main macroeconomic indicators: a
static or highly autoregressive (LHS) group, a "nearly" rational group (middle),
and a group of "pessimistic" agents (RHS), who overreact to macroeconomic
￿ uctuations. Di⁄erent learning rules have been applied to the data, in order
to test whether agents￿are learning and whether their expectations are con-
verging towards rational expectations (perfect foresight). The results obtained
by applying conventional and recursive methods con￿rm our initial conjecture
that behaviour of agents in the RHS of distribution is more associated with
learning dynamics. We also regard the overall distribution as a mixture of nor-
mal distributions. This strategy allows us to get a deeper understanding of the
existence and the main features of convergence and learning in the data, as well
as to identify the demographic participation in each subcomponent.
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1Introduction
Throughout the history of economic thought expectations formation process has at-
tracted much attention, although few studies have focused on household data evidence
from surveys of expectations. Several di⁄erent models have been proposed in the the-
oretical literature on expectations starting from models of where the expected future
values of variables are set to the level of the last observation. The ￿rst explicit analysis
of this expectation rule (usually termed naive or static expectations) is due to Ezekiel
(1938). The idea of adaptive expectations originates in the work of Fisher (1930) and
was formally introduced in the 1950s by several authors, e.g. Nerlove (1958). Nerlove,
Grether and Carvalho (1979) ￿rst modelled expectations as a time series model of the
corresponding variable and termed them as quasi-rational expectations. The concept
of rational expectations was ￿rst discussed in Muth (1961) and in the 1970s it has
been popularised by the work of Lucas and Sargent. Lately, a new view of expecta-
tions has emerged, postulating that agents act as econometricians when forecasting.
This adaptive learning approach is discussed in Evans and Honkapohja (2001).
As far as the empirical literature is concerned the only contributions have come
from the introduction of rationality tests (Pesaran, 1981), and only recently, by an
empirical investigation of the degree of heterogeneity (Branch, 2004, 2005) and infor-
mation stickyness (Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers, 2003). There have been a few studies
that support the introduction of heterogeneous expectations in economic models, e.g.
in a standard animal economy model (Baak, 1999 and Chavas, 2000) and in New
Keynesian macroeconomic model (Pfajfar, 2005). Milani (2005a, b) has advanced
some empirical support for macroeconomic models with learning dynamics.1
Economists know very little about how agents form their expectations in reality.
Recently, it can be said that a consensus has been reached on the view that agents
form their expectations heterogeneously, however, little has been done to investigate
expectations formation in the empirical literature. The studies by Branch (2004,
2005) and Carroll (2003a,b) are noteworthy exceptions. As not all agents are econo-
mists we are focusing our research on household survey of in￿ ation expectations.
Using monthly micro data on in￿ ation expectations provided by the University of
Michigan Survey Research Center, between January 1978 and February 2005, we are
trying to ￿ll this gap in the literature by attempting to determine the sources of
heterogeneity and asymmetries of households￿in￿ ation expectations.
There are three main sources of heterogeneity that have been proposed in the
literature. Agents might make heterogeneous forecasts because they are using dif-
ferent models, they have di⁄erent information sets and they have di⁄erent capacities
to process information. Branch (2004, 2005) assesses the importance of the ￿rst two
sources of heterogeneity and ￿nds that data are consistent with both sources of het-
erogeneity, as the respective models are able to replicate some characteristics of the
1Orphanides and Williams (2003, 2004a,b) have ￿rst advanced some empirical support for learn-
ing dynamics.
2empirical distribution. Nevertheless, he concludes that model uncertainty is the more
prevailing feature in the data. However, he does not consider models, which combine
both sources of heterogeneity. Carroll (2003a,b) focuses on information constraints
as a source of heterogeneity and proposes an epidemiological framework to study how
households model in￿ ation expectations. He ￿nds that the di⁄usion process is rather
slow, although the gap between household and professional forecasters narrows when
in￿ ation matters (lots of media coverage) and households become more attentive. In
comparison with previous studies, this paper focuses on all the three possible roots
of heterogeneity, including di⁄erent capacities to process information, as we are able
to analyse di⁄erent responses across demographic groups.
A few studies have pointed out the di⁄erence between expectations across dif-
ferent demographic subgroups, but these have not stimulated further studies on the
determinants of such heterogeneity. One of the most well known stylised fact in the
literature is that female in￿ ation forecasts are less accurate than those of their male
counterparts (Jonung, 1981; Byran and Venkatu, 2001a, 2001b). As women are usu-
ally responsible for shopping, Jonung (1981) suggests that the di⁄erence is due to
relatively larger rises in food prices compared to the aggregate CPI. We investigate
further on this possible explanation in Section 3. To the best of our knowledge,
only two other studies have brie￿ y analysed in￿ ation expectations across di⁄erent
demographic groups. Palmqvist and Str￿mberg (2004) presented some evidence that
in￿ ation opinions in Sweden are lower among male, more-educated and high income
respondents. The same conclusion was also pointed out in LindØn (2005) when com-
paring perceived and expected in￿ ation in the Euro area. Granato, Lo and Wong
(2003) found boomerang e⁄ect2 in the in￿ ation di⁄usion process across di⁄erent ed-
ucational groups.3
We provide evidence that higher moments are important (contrary to Jonung,
1981) for studying expectation formation and also convergence. We ￿nd that the
variance of in￿ ation expectations is counter-cyclical, i.e. it increases during recessions
and decreases during booms. However, skewness and kurtosis are pro-cyclical, both
decreasing in recessions and increasing in expansionary periods. Also in the period
of stable in￿ ation the variance is less volatile, while skewness and kurtosis are more
volatile. This implies that we can observe some form of convergence lately, while the
number of outliers increases.
We report some descriptive statistics and show that expectations signi￿cantly
di⁄er across demographic groups.4 Income, sex and education seem to be particularly
2If (when) there is misinterpretation in the information aquisition process, less informed agents￿
forecasts confound those of more informed agents (Granato, Lo, and Wong, 2003).
3Dominitz and Manski (2005) have analysed heterogeneity of expectations about equity prices.
They present also some evidence about heterogeneity across demographic groups as they found that
young agents, males and more educated tend to be more optimistic as their counterparts.
4We are neglecting the issue raised in e.g. McGranahan and Paulson (2005) that di⁄erent demo-
graphic groups experience di⁄erent in￿ ation. In their case especially households with elderly agents
experience highest deviation from overall in￿ ation. To consider di⁄erent in￿ ation rates across de-
3important characteristics when forecasting in￿ ation. High income, male and, highly
educated agents produce lower mean squared errors when forecasting in￿ ation.
As the panel we employ is highly unbalanced, we compute the percentiles of the
empirical distribution, obtaining monthly time series which entail information on the
individuals comprised in di⁄erent parts of the distribution. We perform several tests
of rationality, learning, and convergence on the computed percentiles and ￿nd that
we cannot reject the hypothesis of rationality just for a few percentiles around or
slightly above the median. Tests for learning suggest that agents on the right-hand
side of the distribution tend to behave in an adaptive manner, whereas agents on the
left-hand side of distribution do not exhibit such behaviour. To further investigate on
this issue, we estimate several additional time series models of expectation formation.
These models con￿rm a marked degree of heterogeneity and asymmetry in the expec-
tation formation process. The basic result is that agents positioned around the centre
of the distribution behave roughly in line with the rational expectations hypothesis.
However, our results suggest that agents on the left-hand side of the distribution
behave in an autoregressive way. Furthermore, it can be argued that the in￿ ation
expectations of these left of centre agents are stable around some focal points and
that they simply do not observe movements in any of the relevant macroeconomic
variables. In contrast, on the other side of the distribution, agents are generally too
pessimistic and usually produce higher in￿ ation expectations than actual in￿ ation.
As noted above these right of centre agents￿in￿ ation expectations are more consis-
tent with adaptive behaviour (learning), although they vary signi￿cantly in the speed
of learning. Furthermore, we argue that they exhibit some features pointed out by
recent advances in the macroeconomic and ￿nancial literature on inattentiveness and
rationaly heterogeneous expectations models5. We must bear in mind that the cost
of being inattentive increases as in￿ ation increases given that agents have greater in-
centives to in￿ ation forecasts which entail lower systematic errors. Thus, we carefully
study the behaviour of agents over di⁄erent phases of business cycle. We argue that
some combination of both models is likely to be the best way of modelling agents in
this area of the distribution. More precisely, right of centre agents￿in￿ ation expec-
tations could be best explained by two or more autoregressive models (or learning)
with di⁄erent degrees of inattentiveness where agents would switch between di⁄erent
updating speeds according to their relative performance and costs.
To further investigate the degree of heterogeneity and the actual expectations
formation processes, we decompose the distribution into a mixture of normal distri-
mographic groups is beyond the scope of the paper as it would cause problems in the second part
of the paper.
5Inattentiveness - agents upadate their information sets only occasionally - was advanced by Sims
(XXXX) and ￿rst implemented in macroeconomic model by Mankiw and Reis (2003). The theory
of Rationaly Heterogeneous Expectations was put forward by Brock and Hommes (1997). Their
basic argument is that it might not always be optimal from utility maximisation point of view to
use costly-sophisticated predictor that produce lower mean squared error, thus some agents might
be better of with slightly worse predictor which is less costly to use.
4butions. We ￿nd that the distribution can be decomposed into a number of sub-
components which ranges between three and ￿ve Gaussians. For most of the time
window observed, the mean of one of these distributions tracks actual in￿ ation fairly
well and could be characterised as the mean of the rational subgroup, whereas the
others are biased and require a careful study of the underlying expectation formation
processes. In most of the periods, we identify one subcomponent at each tail of the
overall distribution and often at least one centered around some focal point, such as
0 or 5 percent. Since the "classi￿cation" strategy of the subdistributions matters, we
analyse several di⁄erent options.
We also analyse how well di⁄erent models of expectation formation ￿t the esti-
mated data by decomposing the distribution by ML. We conduct di⁄erent exercises Æ
la Branch (2004, 2005). The novelty is that we try di⁄erent combinations of standard
models of expectation formation, such as naive, AR(1), AR(2), VAR and learning,
combining them with di⁄erent information sets. As Branch (2005) has pointed out,
the choice between di⁄erent "degrees" of inattentiveness might produce the best ￿t.
The other novelty would be also to assume di⁄erent evolutionary process, replicator
dynamics instead of Brock and Hommes (1997) multinomial rule. Observed data
from preliminary analysis exhibit dynamics that could be explained by considering
replicator dynamics style switching between groups. Groups on the left-hand side of
the distribution seem to exhibit switching between two focal points.
Our strategy allows to determine the relative shares of each demographic subgroup
in each of the estimated subcomponents of the overall distribution, allowing to check
how well our estimated data perform in the standard New Keynesian macroeconomic
model.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 1 reports in more
detail the dataset employed, while in Section 2 we deliver some preliminary descriptive
statistics. In Section 3 we focus on the percentile time series analysis, with a special
attention for learning dynamics. Section 4 is centered around the decomposition of
the overall distribution into a mixture of normal subcomponents, while Section 5 is
devoted to the analysis of the estimated parameters. In Section 6 we further deepen
our knowledge on the expectation formation process and in Section 7 we implement
the estimated data into the New Keynesian model. Section 8 concludes and gives
some suggestions for further research.
1 The Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behav-
ior
The Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior, conducted by the Survey Research
Center (SRC) at the University of Michigan, is available at a monthly frequency from
1978.01. The survey regards an average of 591 households, with a peak of 1479 in
1978.11 and a minimum of 492 in 1992.11, with an average of approximately 500 re-
5spondents after 1987.01. Each respondent is interviewed once and then reinterviewed
after six months. The sampling method is designed in a way that in any given month
they interview approximately 45% of prior respondents, while the remaining 55% is
composed by new households. Two relevant questions concerning in￿ ation expecta-
tions are whether households expect prices in general to go up, down or to stay the
same in the next 12 months, and to quantify the previous answer. If the answer is
that prices will not change the interviewer must make sure that the interviewees does
not have in mind increase with the same rate as at the time of the interview.
Although we are aware of the existence of precise quantitative data regarding all
of the responds and demographic characteristics of the participants in the survey,
the publicly available version of the survey reports data accumulated in groups ("go
down", "stay the same or down", go up by 1-2%, 3-4%, 5%, 6-9%, 10-14%, 15+%).
There might be some confusion about the category "stay the same or down". Here
we follow Curtin (1996) suggestion to treat them as 0%. A word of caution is also in
order when describing the coding method when households expect prices to go up:
in this case data are available in such a way that 6 ranges of growth are considered,
as well as the possibility that the respondent expects prices to increase but it does
not know to which extent. In the last case we redistribute the respondents across the
six discrete ranges (which predict the price increase), depending on the relative share
on the total population which expects prices to increase and that states by which
percentage. Furthermore, in every month there is an extremely small proportion of
respondents who state that they "don￿ t know" whether prices will increase, decrease
or stay the same during the following 12 months or that do not give an answer:
Following previous statistical analyses and the technical note provided by the SRC
(see Curtin, 1996), we exclude these cases from our sample.
The remaining issue was to determine the points at both ends of the distribution
beyond which observations should be truncated. It is important to note that only
estimates of the mean and variance of the response distribution are in￿ uenced by the
exact speci￿cation of the truncation rule. Estimates of the median of the distribution
are una⁄ected by how the tails of the distribution are truncated. It is also important
to take into account that the upper tail of the distribution is not only long but also
sparse, frequently with large gaps between observations: this point will become ex-
tremely important in the decomposition of the overall distribution into a mixture of
normal distributions, which are aimed at capturing the degree of heterogeneity in the
formation of in￿ ation expectations. Technical considerations regarding the cut-o⁄
procedure are outlined in Curtin (1996). As a matter of fact, in order to assess the
impact of ￿xed truncation rules, Curtin (1996) suggests two alternatives: truncation
at -10% and +50%, and truncation at -5% and +30%. The two alternatives yield
nearly identical trend information, as they were correlated at 0.999. Over the en-
tire time period, the di⁄erence in the mean estimates was just about 0.2 percentage
points, while the variance appears to be constantly higher in the higher truncation
range: however, as Curtin (1996) points out, for most analytic uses of these data,
6the level of observed variance is not as important as the change in the estimated
variances over time. Using this criteria, the two alternative estimates yield nearly
identical trend information. Neither the adoption of the interquantile range, which
appears to be a more appropriate measure of dispersion for highly skewed distribu-
tions and to cope with problems associated with the relatively small sample sizes of
the monthly surveys, points out major di⁄erences. Overall, there seems to be poor
evidence supporting the choice of a truncation rule over the other. The means di⁄er
only marginally, and neither truncation rule yields desirable estimates of dispersion.
Thus in the following analysis we have adopted the smaller truncation range.
An important feature of the data available is their classi￿cation for demographic
subgroups: respondents in the sample are classi￿ed depending on their sex, income
level (low 33%, middle 33% and top 33%), educational level (high school or less, some
college degree and college degree), age (between 18-34, 35-54, and 55+) and territorial
location (east, south, north west and north centre).
2 A preliminary look at the data
In this section we preliminary analyse the available data of the Consumer Survey
on In￿ ation Expectations (CSIE hereafter). For the sake of convenience, in the ￿rst
subsection we describe the main stylised facts characterising the overall sample, and
subsequently we dig deeper in order to highlight major di⁄erences within demographic
subgroups.
The second subsection will be devoted to the analysis of the cyclical pattern
of the moments of the distribution of in￿ ation expectations. In order to take into
consideration di⁄erent in￿ ation regimes, we will pursue a parallel investigation by
truncating the period between 1978.01 and 2005.02 in pre and post 1988:12. This
choice allows us to take in adequate account the high in￿ ationary period characterising
the ￿rst part of the sample.
2.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 reports the time average of the empirical moments of the CSIE distribution,
together with the time average of the actual in￿ ation for the whole period and for
di⁄erent demographic groups.
Insert Table 1 about here
At this stage we can already draw some useful observations that will serve a
guidelines in the subsequent analyses. We can immediately notice that the mean
of the male, top level income, highly educated and elderly individuals is smaller
with respect to the one of their counterparts in the other subgroups as pointed out
7by Palmqvist and Str￿mberg (2004) and LindØn (2005) for Sweden and Euro area.
As regards another measure of central tendency of the population, the median, we
observe that the lowest values corresponds to elderly population and top income level,
while the highest value corresponds to young people and to female respondents. The
time average of the second empirical moment points out how well educated and high
income respondents provide less volatile predictions, especially with respect to bottom
level income, less educated and female individuals who form most volatile predictions.
As it will be possible to observe in the graphic analysis, skewness and kurtosis are
characterised by an high level of covariance: the evidence in this cases is the same as
in the case of the variance. However we will have the chance to observe in the next
section how their cyclical behavior diverges. Table 2 focuses on comparison between
the mean and the median, both in terms of prediction accuracy and as measures of
central tendency of the distribution. We report the sum of squared errors (SSE),
which is given by the di⁄erence between the mean (median) and the actual in￿ ation.
Insert Table 2 about here
It is important to point out that the classi￿cation for income levels has started
in 1979.10. To increase comparability of the data we have normalised the index in
order to take into account the time di⁄erence, but we have to point out that in the
early period the in￿ ation was higher and so were the errors. Thus the estimates of
these groups are still biased downwards. On average, it would seem that the mean is
a better predictor than the median, although this contradicts the evidence described
in Table 1, where the median is always closer to the average in￿ ation: we argue that
the role of outliers is crucial in the explanation of this situation. In order to shed light
on this puzzle we argue that it is useful to conduct a separate analysis by splitting
the sample in pre and post 1988. This threshold constitutes the end of the cycle and
of a marked process of disin￿ ation (see Figure 9), characterised by highly volatile
in￿ ation. Figure 6 reports the plot of skewness and kurtosis against the cycle and
the actual in￿ ation. It is possible to observe that their value is fairly stable and low
during the high in￿ ation period, while it increases and becomes more volatile in the
second part of the sample, when in￿ ation is more stable. Higher kurtosis and higher
positive skewness suggests an higher number of outliers in the right tail of the overall
distribution. It would seem at odds that an higher number of outliers arises when
in￿ ation is under control: however, following the argument underlying the mechanism
developed by Brock and Hommes (1997), it is possible that the opportunistic cost
of being inattentive or relying on a simple forecasting rule (characterised by a lower
degree accuracy) is higher when in￿ ation is high and highly volatile than in periods
in which in￿ ation is kept under control.
With attention to the demographic analysis, it is evident that respondents in the
top income range are more e¢ cient. However, as we have already noted, the income
codi￿cation has started with a year lag: there are no data available for the period
8featured by extremely high in￿ ation. From the comparison of the forecast accuracy
between and within groups, it is possible to put forward a conjecture on the role of the
income level (followed by sex and education) as one of the most relevant demographic
characteristics for the in￿ ation forecasting process6. The basic lesson we can learn is
that for the more biased subgroups, the mean is a more accurate forecast than the
median: opposite evidence holds for the less biased groups. This evidence is in line
with what we have preliminary observed in terms of dynamic behaviour of skewness
and kurtosis.
Insert Table 3 and 4 about here
Tables 3 and 4 report the moments of the empirical moments of the CSIE dis-
tribution for the truncated sample. The data con￿rms a lower level of skewness
and kurtosis in the ￿rst part of the sample (opposite evidence holds for the second
moment). Furthermore, the prediction accuracy, both in terms of the mean and the
median, is higher in the second part of the sample. The di⁄erence between and within
demographic groups pointed out before maintains the same features even by splitting
the sample.7
We now perform a brief graphic analysis of the variables of interest. It is worth
pointing out at this stage that all the series of expectational variables are reported
at the realised date. Figure 1 plots the mean and the median against the actual
in￿ ation.
Insert Figure 1 about here
It is evident how both constantly underestimate the rise in in￿ ation at the be-
ginning of the sample, although the forecasting performance improves remarkably
for the subsequent de￿ ation: this improvements is probably due to the credibility
that the FED acquired in lowering in￿ ationary pressures and also as noted before the
opportunistic cost of being inattentive in this period is comparatively higher.
As regards the post-1988 subsample, expectations are quite stable, although they
almost systematically fail to forecast periods of low in￿ ation. Furthermore, we can
observe how expectation fail to account for the marked rise in the price level during
the ￿rst Gulf War, reacting with a consistent delay. This over reaction is also present
after the 9/11, but in this case in the opposite direction.
Insert Figure 2, 3, 4 about here
6We do not dig deeper into the analysis of the statistical evidence available in the case of the
regional partition, even because it would require to take in adequate account the presence of asym-
metric shocks within the country.
7To properly asses the importance of inattention we would probably have to compare the relative
error. We investigate this further in the next section.
9Figure 2 and Figure 3 plot the mean, variance and skewness and kurtosis, respec-
tively: It is trivial to observe how higher in￿ ationary expectations are associated to
high volatility. Opposite evidence, as we noted in the previous subsection, holds with
respect to skewness and kurtosis.
Figure 4 reports the 25th, the 50th and the 75th percentiles. This graph helps to
understand the di⁄erent variability characterising di⁄erent parts of the distribution.
A further, more analytical study will be performed in the next section, in which
we analyse the macroeconomic determinants of the dynamics of each percentile, in
order to detect sources of asymmetry in the response of the distribution over the
business cycle. At this stage we limit ourselves to a mere graphic analysis. Firstly,
the 75th percentile appears to be remarkably stable after 1988 with respect to the
two remaining series, although the 50th percentile appears to react less, although
with delay, to the in￿ ationary pressures brought by the ￿rst Gulf War, probably
because the respondents comprised in this range have partially internalised in their
expectations that the rise in in￿ ation is not due to last. The 25th percentile, on the
other way, reacts less to the 9/11. Interestingly, the 50th percentile reacts most to
the 9/11.
Insert Figure 5 about here
Figure 5 reports the plot of mean of the distribution against the actual level of
in￿ ation and the mean of the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) on in￿ ation
expectations: it is striking how the former, generally more accurate in the second part
of the sample, is more biased than the one of the consumers in the highly in￿ ationary
period. The two predictions are remarkably similar from 1984 to 1990 and from this
point onwards the SPF seems to provide a more accurate prediction.
2.2 Cyclical behavior of the CSIE distribution
In this section we will outline the cyclical features of the empirical moments of the
CSIE distribution. As there are no major di⁄erences in the dynamic pattern of the
moments of the overall distribution with respect to the subgroups￿distributions that
can be observed from the graphical analysis,8 the ￿rst part of this section will be
devoted to the study of the general features. The second part will focus on the
description of the major di⁄erences within groups. Di⁄erences within groups are
limited to the level and to the variability of the moments.
Insert Figure 6, 7 about here
Figures 6 and 7 report the higher moments of the distribution against the output
gap series and an indicator of the cycle (the HP detrended Industrial Production In-
dex (IPI) and interpolated estimates of Kuttner￿(1994) model of multivariate Kalman
8This is studied more in depth later when we do the percentile time series analysis.
10￿ltering). It is clear how variance has a counter cyclical behaviour, while skewness
and kurtosis are highly procyclical. As pointed out before, the third and the fourth
moments display higher variability in the period post-1988. Furthermore, kurtosis
exhibits increasing variability in correspondence with peaks in the cycle, which prob-
ably re￿ ect uncertainty about the future and hence more unstable tails of the overall
distribution.
In appendix A we report a number of graphs analogous to the ones presented in
this section for each demographic subgroup. The cyclical behaviour of the empirical
moments outlined in this section is con￿rmed by moving at a higher level of disag-
gregation. Generally speaking, the visual impression we get from the observation of
the plots con￿rms the results reported in tables 1-4: in terms of mean and median,
we can state that male, highly educated, top income level respondents are usually
provide more accurate predictions. In terms of variance, their counterparts appear
to be much more volatile (see, e.g., the di⁄erence between male and female). The
analysis of the skewness and the within group comparison point out an interesting
situation: the subgroups of male, highly educated, top income level respondents have
generally an higher level of skewness, which appears to be much more volatile. These
groups are associated with lower mean square errors when forecasting in￿ ation, so we
would expect that there are more outliers on the right-hand side of the distribution
and thus higher skewness.
As regards the kurtosis, the same observations as drawn in the case of skewness
can be pointed out and for the same groups. The dynamics in skewness is strikingly
similar to the one chracterising kurtosis: their level points out the existence of a long
right tail chracterised by high variability. From this evidence we might conjecture the
existence of an highly volatile component on the right end of a hypothetical mixture
of distributions, and we will actually investigate further on this. However, bare eye
can lead to conclusion that high peaks in variability are not associated to any cyclical
phase or any change in the cycle.9 Thus, we might conclude that the rise of outliers
in the subgroups with higher kurtosis and positive skewness could at this stage be
considered as erratic and non systematic, while their subgroup counterparts have a
lower but more stable level of outliers in the right tail. We investigate this further in
the next section.
2.3 Time series analysis of the empirical moments
To further investigate the properties of empirical moments we estimate the following
two models:
emtjt￿12 = ￿0 + ￿1￿t￿12 + ￿2yt￿12 + ￿3it￿12 + ￿4rt￿12 + ￿5t + ￿6emt￿1jt￿13 (1)
￿emtjt￿12 = ￿10￿￿t￿12 + ￿11￿yt￿12 + ￿12￿it￿12 + ￿13￿rt￿12 + ￿14￿emt￿1jt￿13 (2)
9This is studied more in depth later when we do the percentile time series analysis.
11yt denotes a cycle indicator (detrended industrial production index (IPI)), it is
the real short term interest rate (3 months t-bill), rt is the long term interest rate
(10 years t-bond yield). We estimate the above equations (em) for the inerquantile
range, variance, skewness and kurtosis.
Insert Table 5, 6 about here
In this section we brie￿ y discuss the results of the analysis on the macroeconomic
drivers of the empirical moments of the overall distribution of in￿ ation expectations.
The models employed have been reported by equations (1-2). The set of regressors
comprises a constant, a deterministic trend, a cycle indicator, actual in￿ ation and real
short and long term interest rates. We immediately con￿rm the evidence of a negative
trend in the variance and of a positive one in skewness and kurtosis, which was clear
from a graphical inspection. The interpretation of the estimated coe¢ cients for cycle
and in￿ ation at the time of the forecast do not pose any particular problem. In
accordance with what observed graphically, we can point out a clear counter-cyclicity
of variance, while skewness and kurtosis display a marked pro-cyclical behaviour.
On the other side, as we would expect upon theoretical grounds, the sign of the
estimated coe¢ cients is inverted in the case of in￿ ation. This evidence is particularly
important under the perspective provided by the literature on rational inattention,
whereas higher and more volatile in￿ ationary pressures should lead agents to raise
the level of attention and accuracy in forecasting, while periods of relatively stable
in￿ ation, such as the post-1988 period, imply a lower level of attention. A decreasing
number of outliers (i.e. lower kurtosis) as in￿ ation increases might ￿t within this
framework. The evidence on kurtosis, moreover, will be con￿rmed by the percentile
regressions models that will be presented in the next section, as units in the upper
end of the distribution seem to be more reactive with respect to in￿ ation dynamics.
In order to compare the di⁄erent impacts of the exogenous regressors under di⁄erent
in￿ ationary regimes we have splitted the sample in pre- and post- December 1988.10
The empirical exercise shows that coe¢ cients attached to cycle and in￿ ation keep
the same sign, although they both decrease in absolute value in the second part of
the sample. The interpretation of this evidence can be enriched by adding to the
picture the e⁄ect brought by interest rate regressors. After 1988 agents probably
understand the relevance of the informational content of interest rates, being the
short term interest rate the main intermediate target adopted by the FED to ￿ght
in￿ ation, while the t-bond yield incorporates a premium for in￿ ation, hence providing
an important benchmark for in￿ ation forecasting.
The regressions carried out on the full sample deliver interesting results as re-
gards the informational content of short and long term interest rates. The sign of the
estimated coe¢ cients is consistent with the considerations outlined in the previous
paragraph. For the variance, t-bill assumes a positive coe¢ cient while t-bond has a
10Results are reported in Appendix C.
12negative estimated impact, meaning that if the long term yield increases, it probably
re￿ ects increased in￿ ation expectations that cause more volatility at a cross sectional
dimension, while if the t-bill rate increases, it re￿ ects the will of the central bank
to ￿ght in￿ ation strenuously. As regards skewness and kurtosis, the impact of the
estimated coe¢ cients is now inverted: higher t-bill rate (which is likely to re￿ ect
commitment to ￿ght in￿ ation) leads to an increased number of outliers, especially on
the RHS of the distribution, probably because agents, relying on the CB￿ s commit-
ment, have a lower degree of attention. Opposite arguments hold for the estimated
coe¢ cient of t-bond yield . In order to check whether a term structure e⁄ect is at
work, we have also estimated the two models adopting as a regressor the spread be-
tween long and short term interest rates. As expected, in the ￿rst model (variables in
levels), the coe¢ cient is highly signi￿cant and negative for the third and the fourth
moment, while it positive for the variance. However, the contribution of the change
in the horizontal spread to changes in the moments is null. The evidence on the role
played by interest rates and the term structure gains more relevance if we consider
the post-1988 period, when the new route undertaken by monetary policy has been
designed by taking more in consideration the detrimental e⁄ects of in￿ ation. In the
￿rst part of the sample the estimated coe¢ cients attached to the interest rate vari-
ables are always insigni￿cant in the model expressed in ￿rst di⁄erences for all the
moments under scrutiny. On the other hand for the ￿rst model they are signi￿cant,
although lower in absolute value with respect to their counterparts estimated in the
￿rst part of the sample.
2.3.1 Evidence on Demographic Subgroups
The evidence carried out for the overall sample is generally con￿rmed by considering
di⁄erent demographic subgroups.11 In this case we have considered the e⁄ect of in-
terest rate variable just by introducing the horizontal spread in the set of regressors.
Both for the ￿rst and the second model, the sign of the estimated coe¢ cients and
their signi￿cance denote the same features outlined in the general case. The most
interesting result comes from the analysis of the degree of heterogeneity characteris-
ing the response of the moments of the various sub-distributions to macroeconomic
determinants. The ￿rst result is that both models have a better ￿t (in terms of R2)
in the case of the variance, and a lower one for skewness and kurtosis, if we look at
the outcome for male, highest income level, highest education and highest age range,
with respect to their counterparts. As regards the ￿rst model (in levels) applied to
the variance, we can notice how for these classes constant and trend have a lower im-
pact, while the estimated coe¢ cients are higher in absolute value for the remaining
regressors. As regards skewness and kurtosis, all regressors seem to have a higher
impact, with exception for the trend and the horizontal spread for the skewness.
In the second model (in di⁄erences), these results are con￿rmed for skewness
11Results are reported in Appendix C.
13and kurtosis. For the variance, apart from the autoregressive component, all the
remaining explanatory variables have lower impact for male, highest income level,
highest education and highest age range with respect to their counterparts. In all the
cases the term structure seems not to have any importance in this model.
3 Percentile Time Series Analysis
3.1 Rational Expectations, Learning Dynamics and Conver-
gence
3.1.1 Asymmetries in the Expectation Formation Process
In this section we perform a quantile time series analysis. The aim is to move a
￿rst step towards the detection of heterogeneity in the response of di⁄erent regions of
the CSIE distribution with respect to macroeconomic variables which are relevant to
the rational process of expectation formation (such as output gap, actual in￿ ation,
short and long term interest rates and the horizontal spread between them, which is
aimed at capturing some term structure e⁄ect). Furthermore, we introduce in the set
of regressors the mean of the distribution determined by the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF hereafter), currently conducted by the FED of Philadelphia12. This
choice is motivated by the need to observe whether a di⁄usion process is at work:
such a mechanism is likely to have an asymmetric e⁄ect on di⁄erent households.
Carroll (2003a,b) designs an epidemiological framework to model how respondents to
the Michigan Survey actually form their expectations. For this purpose, he models
the evolution of in￿ ationary expectations relying on the assumption that households
update their information set from news reports, which at the same time are strongly
in￿ uenced by the expectations of professional forecasters. As Pesaran and Weale
(2005) point out, the di⁄usion process is, however, slow due to inattentiveness of the
households.13
The choice of the percentile time series, apart from being a useful device to capture
asymmetric responses in the distribution of in￿ ationary expectations, is also driven
by a more practical consideration: the panel retrievable from the survey is highly
unbalanced, as the households interviewed change over time. Thus we extract a set of
time series that can be used to capture the evolution of the cross-sectional distribution
12From 1968 to 1990 NBER and ASA were responsible for the conduction of the survey. Before
the 1981 the data exists only for GDP de￿ ator forecasts. So we use that data for the ￿rst few years
of our sample.
13Thus as Pesaran and Weale (2005) point out, even if the expectations of professional forecasters
are rational the expectations of households will only slowly adapt. Carroll (2003a,b) ￿nds that
the Michigan Survey has a mean square error on average almost twice that of the SPF. He ￿nds
that the SPF in￿ ation expectations Granger-cause household in￿ ation expectations but household
expectations do not seem to Granger-cause professional forecasts.
14over the cycle. Here is a brief explanation of the technique employed. Regard the
expected change in price level during the following 12 months as a random variable,
denoted by ￿e, which is distributed with respect to some continuous distribution,
F(￿). The pth quantile of the distribution, denoted by ￿e
p, is the value below which
(100 ￿ p)% of the distribution lies, hence F(￿e
p) = p. Thus, we can compute a set of
ordered statistics for each month, obtaining a 99(= p) time series of percentiles. Of
course, the number of observation in the cross-section varies over time. This method
is a convenient way to build up a balanced panel of quantiles, after ￿xing p.
Given our sample sizes, at each cut-o⁄, we can be con￿dent that the estimated
quantiles are good estimates of population quantiles: for any two sample ordered
statistics ￿e
t;k and ￿e
t;k+h, the amount of probability in the population distribution
contained in the interval (￿e
t;k ; ￿e
t;k+h) is a random variable, which does not depend
on F(￿). Relying on these considerations, for each time period the cross sectional
sample is classi￿ed in percentiles, thus obtaining 99 time series of percentiles. Per-
centiles have been obtained by interpolating the distribution obtained after applying
the redistribution and the truncation methods outlined in the previous section. In-
terpolation is a convenient way for obtaining the percentiles at this stage, as the
survey reports the percentage of respondents in each range of price movement, hence
constituting already a sort of ordered statistic. In section 4 we recover a population
of respondents through a di⁄erent interpolation method: the resulting percentiles
display a 0.999 correlation with the counterparts used in this section. Furthermore,
in order to perform some robustness analysis, di⁄erent interpolation methods have
been applied (such as linear and cubic), which do not yield to major di⁄erences.
Given these premises, we specify the following percentile regression:
￿
k
tjt￿12 = ￿0 + ￿1￿t￿12 + ￿2￿t￿14 + ￿3￿t￿24 + ￿4￿t￿30 + ￿5yt￿12 + ￿6yt￿14 + (3)






We denote with ￿k
tjt￿12 the kth percentile of the 12 months ahead expected change
in prices, while ￿F
tjt￿12 denotes the mean of the 12 months ahead expected change in
prices derived from the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
In order to capture the determinants of monthly changes in in￿ ation expectations,



































￿6 (yt ￿ yt￿13) + ￿7 (it ￿ it￿13) + ￿8 (rt ￿ rt￿13) + (4)






15where coe¢ cients ￿1 and ￿2 describe the e⁄ect determined by lagged forecast errors
for the kth percentile, ￿4 and ￿5 capture the degree of persistence, ￿6, ￿7 (￿8) capture
the e⁄ect of changes in the output gap and in the short (long) term interest rate
respectively, while ￿9 is aimed at capturing the e⁄ect of ￿ ips in the yield curve.
Finally, ￿10 captures the extent to which non-professional forecasters revise their
expectation, when also professional forecasters revise their expectation.
To investigate more in depth the nature of the forecast error we estimate the
following relations: evidence of serial correlation in the forecast error process indi-
cates that there is an ine¢ cient exploitation of information from last year￿ s forecast
in generating current year￿ s forecast, hence violating the rationality hypothesis. Fur-
thermore, in order to capture the possibility of an e¢ cient exploitation of relevant










+ ￿2 [(it ￿ rt) ￿ (it￿13 ￿ rt￿13)] +
￿3 (yt ￿ yt￿13) + ￿4(￿t ￿ ￿
F
tjt￿12) + ￿5 (￿t ￿ ￿t￿13) + "t (5)
k = 1;:::;99
3.1.2 Testing for Rationality
We now apply some tests of rationality commonly employed in the literature14. The
rational expectations hypothesis can be interestingly applied to survey expectations
data, as these allow to determine di⁄erent degrees of forecast e¢ ciency: the latter
has to be intended as the result of a forecasting procedure that does not yield to
predictable errors. The simplest test of e¢ ciency is a test of bias15. It is possible, by
regressing the expectation error on a constant, to verify whether in￿ ation expectations
are centred around the right value
￿t ￿ ￿
k
tjt￿12 = ￿ (6)
where ￿t is in￿ ation at time t and ￿k
tjt￿12 is kth percentile from the survey in￿ ation
expectations. The following regression represents a convenient test for rationality
￿t = a + b￿
k
tjt￿12 (7)
where rationality implies that a = 0 and b = 1, jointly. The last expression can be
simply augmented to test whether information in a forecast is fully exploited
￿t ￿ ￿
k
tjt￿12 = a + (b ￿ 1)￿
k
tjt￿12 (8)
14See Pesaran (1989), Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2004) and Bakhshi and Yates (1998) for a review
of these tests.
15See, for an application, Jonung and Laidler (1988) and Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003).
16Testing remains the same as in the previous regression: under the null of ratio-
nality these regressions are meant to have no predictive power16.
3.1.3 Estimating Simple Learning Rules
Di⁄erent learning rules will be implemented for the Michigan Survey data, in order
to test whether agents￿expectations are converging towards rational expectations
(perfect foresight). For a discussion on di⁄erent learning rules and convergence to
rational expectations see Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Learning will be ￿rst tested
in a model with constant gain learning, where convergence to rational expectations is













where # is the constant gain parameter. Under this learning rule agents revise their
expectations according to the error of the last realised forecast. Since in the survey
of in￿ ation expectations agents are asked to forecast in￿ ation in the next year time
(hence they make their forecast at time t ￿ 12), the revision will regard the previous
period￿ s forecast (at time t ￿ 13), which was made at time t ￿ 25.














The empirical approach will consist in estimating # and ￿. & is arbitrary small
number and { is the coe¢ cient that controls the dampening of the learning gain. If
we want that the learning always converges to the rational expectations { ￿ 1. If the
estimated parameters will be signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 0, then we could conclude
that agents are actually learning from their past mistakes.
3.1.4 Recursive Representation of Simple Learning Rules
The above speci￿cation is mainly devoted to test whether data support the adaptive
behaviour of agents. Since in the adaptive learning literature we are assuming that
agents behave like econometricians, and they use all the available information at the
time of the forecast, we have to specify a recursive model for the two di⁄erent learning
rules mentioned above. We will assume that agents￿perceived law of motion (PLM)
will be a simple AR(1) process
￿
s
tjt￿12 = ￿0;t + ￿1;t￿t￿13 + "t (11)
16Alternative test for rationality could take into account that in￿ ation and in￿ ation expectations
data are I(1): in this situation the rational expectations hypothesis suggests that they cointegrate,
i.e. that expectations errors are stationary, and that the cointegrating vector has no constant terms,
as well as coe¢ cients on expected and actual in￿ ation which are equal in absolute value (Bakhshi
and Yates, 1998).
17When agents are estimating their PLM they exploit all the available information
up to period t. As new data become available they update their estimates according to
a constant gain learning or a decreasing gain learning rule. First we specify stochastic
gradient learning with constant or decreasing gain and then we focus on least square




and b ￿t = ￿
￿0;t ￿1;t
￿0. In stochastic gradient learning agents update coe¢ cients according to
the following rule:




￿t ￿ Xtb ￿t￿1
￿
(12)
In the updating algorithm for decreasing gain learning we replace # with ￿
&t{.






￿t ￿ Xtb ￿t￿1
￿
(13)
In least square learning agents take into account also the matrix of second mo-
ments of Xt, Rt. In the case of constant gain they update their coe¢ cients in the
following way:






￿t ￿ Xtb ￿t￿1
￿
(14)







As before, in the updating algorithm for decreasing gain learning we replace #
with ￿
&t{.








￿t ￿ Xtb ￿t￿1
￿
(16)









The empirical approach will consist in ￿nding # and ￿ and { that minimise the







3.1.5 Testing for convergence: Weighted least squares learning and the
Kalman ￿lter
In this section the coe¢ cients in the PLMare updated through the following algorithm









￿t ￿ Xtb ￿t￿1
￿
(18)





￿ and ￿￿ is a sequence of positive numbers. This formula is
a version of weighted least squares, which also corresponds to recursive least squares
18if ￿￿ = 1. This updating procedure can be implemented into the Kalman ￿lter
formulae. Let Pt = 1
tR
￿1
t and ft = XtPt￿1X0
t + 1
￿t:
We end up with the following equation
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￿





which corresponds to the state-space model
￿
s
tjt￿12 = ￿0;t + ￿1;t￿t￿13 + et
8i ￿i;t = ￿i;t￿1 + ￿i;t





V ar(￿t) = 0 (20)
As the least square estimation assumes that the coe¢ cients are stable, while their
estimated counterparts are time varying, the learning process is not optimal. The
results in Marcet and Sargent (1989) on the convergence of the learning process
towards rational expectations hold only when the law of motions of parameters are
viewed as invariant. Hence, if V ar(￿t) 6= 0 then Pt does not converge towards 0; and
consequently the learning does not converge to rational expectations. The coe¢ cients
in a more general state-space setting would be derived as follows






￿t ￿ Xtb ￿t￿1
￿
(21)





where ft = XtPt￿1X0
t + Ht, V ar(et) = Ht and V ar(￿t) = Qt. Therefore, the expec-




tjt￿12 = ￿1;tjt￿1 + ￿2;tjt￿1￿t￿13 (23)
Note that Kalman ￿lter delivers the optimal gain that agents apply when updating
their parameters. It also allows to test whether the learning is perpetual or whether
is converging to rational expectations. Practically, the procedure implies a test of
signi￿cance of the variance of the state variables.
193.2 Results: Overall Sample
As already mentioned, we perform the estimation of the models outlined in the pre-
vious section for each percentile. Our goal is to establish some stylised facts about
sources of asymmetries in the response to movements in macroeconomic variables
useful for the process of expectation formation, degree of biasness, and the learning
dynamics. In this section we present the results obtained. We have estimated several
of the model outlined above also for the subsamples of our period of analysis but
we did not observe mayor di⁄erences, so we are reporting the results mainly for the
whole sample and just outlining some interesting results for the subsamples.
3.2.1 Rationality tests
We start percentile time series analysis with rationality tests. When running re-
gressions on equation (6) we can observe that only agents between 51-55th (52-54th)
percentile are not biased at 1% signi￿cance (5% signi￿cance). When splitting the
sample to pre-1988 and post-1988, we found that for pre-1988 sample agents between
55-63th (56-62th) percentile are not biased at 1% signi￿cance (5% signi￿cance). For
1999-2005 period we found that agent between 47-50th (48-50th) percentile are not
biased at 1% signi￿cance (5% signi￿cance). Estimating equation (8) and computing
the F-test we ￿nd that it is always possible to reject the null hypothesis (rationality)
that the ￿rst coe¢ cient (a) is 0 and the second (b) is 1 for the whole sample and two
subsamples.
3.2.2 Learning
The next test are the tests for simple learning rules or in the ￿rst case the degree of
adaptiveness of in￿ ation expectations. First we estimate equation (9) and then (10).
In the latter we set & = { = 1.17
Insert Figures 8-11 about here
The estimates suggest that agents in the upper part of the distribution are be-
having at least partly in an adaptive way while for the agents comprised in the poor
hand of the distribution the past error has little or no explanatory power. As regards
the estimated constant gain and the overall R2, we can observe the hump-shaped
response between 40th and 99th percentile which peaks around 75th percentile, i.e. in
the range in which that percentile past errors have the highest explanatory power.
Below we will generalise this regression by including also other possible explanatory
variables.
The decreasing gain learning estimates are con￿rming that agents between 40th
and 95th percentile are behaving partly in an adaptive way. Indeed, the decreasing
17Results are oulined below in the Table 8.
20gain estimates are suggesting that this method of learning is more in line with the
bahaviour of agents in the upper part of distribution. As noticed before, also this
method of learning has no explanatory power for agents comprised in the left-hand
side of the distribution. Also in this case we observe a hump-shaped response, al-
though the adjusted R2 peaks around 0:75, compared to a value of about 0:35 obtained
in the case of constant gain learning. A higher explanatory power of the decreasing
gain learning might be due to high in￿ ationary period at the beginning of our sample.
We have also estimated the constant gain learning and decreasing gain learning by
means of recursive techniques, determining the optimal gains with the minimum SSE.
We set ￿ = 1: The problem when estimating recursively learning is how to set initial
values. This problem is extensively discussed in Carceles-Poveda and Giannitsarou
(2005). Stricktly speaking this problem should not occur in our case since we are just
trying to replicate our time-series as close as possible. Thus in the case of gradient
learning we designed this exercise so that we are searching for the best combinations of
gain and initial values to match as closely as possible each percentile.18 Preliminary
results are suggesting that agents starts learning above the 55th percentile, where
the gain almost immediately jumps to the highest value. Afterwards the gain starts
slowly decaying and converging to zero.[this results are very preliminary]
Next we focus on least squares learning. To simplify the exercise (for this prelimi-
nary version) we decided to approximate initial conditions by
￿
0:01 + k
100 0:5 + k
100
￿
and set variance-covariance matrix to be constant across the percentiles.
Insert Figures 12-15 about here
The results con￿rm our initial conjecture that behaviour of agents in the RHS
of distribution is more associated with learning dynamics as speci￿ed above. The
"optimal" gain in CGL was estimated between 0 and 0.045. Overall we can say
that decreasing gain learning slightly better replicates the bahaviour of agents. It
would be interesting to proceed with analysing learning behaviour where agents could
endogenously switch between both algorithms (especially after structural breaks).
This way of learning would probably result in even better ￿t of the data.
[To be added more]
3.2.3 Perpetual Learning vs. Convergence
[To be added]
3.2.4 Percentile Regressions
The evidence arising from the percentile time series regressions generally con￿rm the
presence of a marked degree of heterogeneity in the process of expectation formation.
Since we get very similar results by splitting the sample we report just the results for
18This approach has however an obvious practical drawback as it is computationally very intensive.
21the whole sample. Relying on a visual impression obtained from the models (3)￿(5),
we can identify (at least) three intervals of marginal response of the dependent variable
to the regressors introduced in the estimation. This evidence might be due to the
existence of di⁄erent models of expectation formation for the individuals comprised
in the overall distribution. In the next section we will investigate further on this
issue, regarding the CSIE distribution as a mixture of Gaussian distributions, each
of these corresponding to a di⁄erent sub-group characterised by a peculiar model of
expectation formation.
On empirical grounds, we can roughly consider the ￿rst interval, the one at the
poor hand of the distribution, as the one characterised by agents that do not observe
(or do not take into account) the relevant variables for producing one-year-ahead
in￿ ation expectations. On the other way, individuals comprised in the interval cor-
responding to the upper tail, although observing the relevant information, seem to
overreact to movements in the regressors, denoting a high degree of "pessimism".
Intuitively, the middle range of response should comprise rational individuals.
Insert Table 7 about here
We now describe the main stylised facts arising from the estimation of each model.
As already mentioned the model (3) aims at characterising the relevance of the de-
terminants of the one-year-ahead in￿ ation expectations. We introduce in the set of
exogenous regressors the following contemporaneous (hence at the time in which ex-
pectations are formed) and lagged variables: rate of in￿ ation, cycle (measured as the
HP detrended IPI), short term interest rate (3m treasury bill), long term interest
rate (10y bond yield) and the one-year-ahead expectation taken from the Survey of
Professional Forecasters. It turns out that just some of the mentioned regressors can
actually account for the movements in the dependent variable and contextually have
a clear cut interpretation. Thus we are setting in our model ￿2 = ::: = ￿4 = 0
and ￿6 = ::: = ￿9 = 0 as they are almost always insigni￿cant. We can mention,
among these, the contemporaneous rate of in￿ ation and the autoregressive term and
to some degree as well the forecasts of the SPF. As far as the remaining regressors
are concerned, on empirical grounds we can argue that these variables are generally
either not observed or not taken into account for the determination of the expectation
at each range of the CSIE distribution. Only the contemporaneous cycle is slightly
signi￿cant. The resulting response functions have been plotted in ￿gures XX in the
Appendix B. Furthermore, ￿gure 8 reports the total R2 for each regression as well as
the contribution of each regressor to the explanation of the variation of a dependent
variable (Sherrer (1984))19. This statistic provides important information on the dif-
19As it is well known, the coe¢ cient of multiple determination measures the proportion of the
variance of a dependent variable y explained by a set of explanatory variables. It can be computed as
R2 =
Pk
j=1 ajryxj, where aj is the standardized regression coe¢ cient of the jth explanatory variable
and ryxj is the simple correlation coe¢ cient (Pearson￿ s r) between y and xj. Scherrer de￿nes ajryxj
as the contribution of the jth variable to the explanation of the variance of y.
22ferent information structure underlying the mechanism of expectation formation for
the individuals comprised in di⁄erent ranges of the distribution.
Insert Figure 16 about here
As it is clear from ￿gures in the Appendix B, in the upper tail of the distribution
the constant (from the 85th percentile onwards) as well as the estimated coe¢ cient
associated to the actual in￿ ation (from the 70th percentile onwards) assume high
values. This element corroborates the evidence arising from the observation of the
descriptive statistics, con￿rming a marked degree of pessimism for the upper tail of
the distribution. On the other way, looking at the response function for the actual
in￿ ation in the middle range (in the interval [25th;70th]), we can notice an evident
hump-shaped pattern. On the other way, within the same interval, the autoregressive
term determines a U-shaped response. These results are in line with what we would
expect on a theoretical ground, as more rational individuals should rely less on past
expectations, displaying a lower degree of stickyness, and rely more on actual in￿ ation,
which is likely to have a higher informational content.
An interesting situation can be outlined from the observation of the graph report-
ing the overall R2 and the partial "contribution" coe¢ cients. It is clear that up to
the 70th percentile most of the variance in the dependent variable can actually be ex-
plained by taking into consideration the autoregressive term, while the second highest
contribution comes from the introduction of the contemporaneous rate of in￿ ation,
which becomes more important for the upper tail.
Insert Table 8 and Figure 17 about here
The second model aims at explaining what determines change in the forecasts.
In order to do that we assume as regressors the ￿rst di⁄erences of the variables
introduced in the previous model. It turns out that the explanatory power of the
regressors is quite poor, apart from the ￿rst autoregressive term. Thus we are setting
￿7 = ::: = ￿9 = 0. which has a high partial contribution coe¢ cient along the whole
distribution as can be seen in Figure 9 (see also ￿gures in the Appendix B). Its
contribution starts decreasing only from the 70th percentile, leaving room for the
last observed error and the second autoregressive term. The overall coe¢ cient of
determination still displays a hump-shaped pattern in the middle range. This model
can actually be treated as extended model of the estimated simple learning rules. As
in that model here we can also observe the coe¢ cient on the observed past forecast
error to be signi￿cant on the right-hand side of the distribution.
Insert Table 9 about here
23The third model (5) proposed aims at providing a deeper understanding of the
determinants of the forecast error, which is assumed as the dependent variable (￿t ￿
￿k
tjt￿12). It is worth mentioning again that evidence of serial correlation in the forecast
error process indicates that there is an ine¢ cient exploitation of information from last
year￿ s forecast in generating current year￿ s forecast, which violates the rationality
hypothesis. We have introduced in the set of exogenous regressors the last observed
forecast errors, the horizontal spread between long and short term interest rate, the
change in the cycle, the change in in￿ ation and the contemporaneous forecast error
from the SPF. The resulting response functions are reported in various ￿gures in the
Appendix B. It turns out that the coe¢ cient associated to horizontal spread is never
found to be signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero, at any percentile. The same evidence
holds for the coe¢ cient of the cyclical component, but just from the 45th percentile
onwards, while in the previous range it has a negative sign. It is also worth noting
that the function built up with constant is downward sloping and crosses the zero
line in correspondence of the 51th percentile, which is classically associated with the
"rational" group. The response function associated to the last observed forecast error
is fairly constant up to the 30th percentile and it assumes a marked U-shaped pattern
afterwards. As regards the average error of the professional forecasters, which on
theoretical grounds is actually expected to get a signi￿cant and positive coe¢ cient,
we can actually notice that the response is ￿rst constant and then hump shaped
around 55th percentile, while it decreases in the last deciles.
Insert Figure 18 about here
The most important inference probably comes from the observation of the coe¢ -
cient of the determination and from the partial "contribution" coe¢ cients associated
to each regressor. The ￿rst one declines as we move towards the upper end of the dis-
tribution, but not monotonically, displaying a quite marked hump-shaped pattern in
the ￿rst two ranges and assuming a U-shaped pattern from the 70th percentile. This
evidence has important implications for the informational structure underlying each
group. The interpretation will appear more clear cut after observing the partial con-
tribution coe¢ cients. It appears that the last observed error has a great importance
for the ￿rst range, which has classically displayed a backward looking, "adaptive"
behaviour. This might be also due to that they are not observing current in￿ ation as
their error could be explained by the past errors and they are just making in￿ ation
expectations around focal points such as 0 or 5 percent. The variance of forecast
errors of the third group, located in the upper end is almost exclusively explained
by the variance of the change in the actual in￿ ation. Total R2 decreases thus they
are observing all the variables, although their error could not be explained by these
variables, but just with the constant. That again points to the "pessimism" of that
agents. But there is another possible interpretation that arises from the results as
the change in the in￿ ation is the most important variable and the rise in in￿ ation
24decreases forecast errors. This leads together with the fact that autoregressive com-
ponent has almost no explanatory power to the conclusion that agents comprising
this part of the distribution might be behaving in lines with recent literature on inat-
tentiveness and rationally heterogeneous expectations. They are more attentive when
in￿ ation rises since the opportunity cost of being inattentive in this period rises. As
regards the middle range, we can actually notice that the contribution of the past
error decreases, while the one of the error of the professional forecasters gains impor-
tance. Considering the professional forecasters as a "general" stereotype of rational
agents, we can actually infer that the middle range, especially around the 50th ￿55th
percentile, is the less biased, as the evidence arising from the test of unbiasedness
in the pervious section. In that region the error of professional forecasters is actu-
ally almost the only important variable for determination of the forecast error. This
equation could be considered as a test of rationality. The test could be that the
￿0 = ::: = ￿3 = ￿5 = 0: The only signi￿cant could be ￿4. We tried to add several
lags of the SPF to the equation to assess the Carroll￿ s (2003a,b) ￿nding that the
transmission e⁄ect from professional forecasters to households is quite slow, but in
our case the additional lags tend to be insigni￿cant.
3.3 Results: Di⁄erent Demographic Groups
Below we brie￿ y outline the main results for di⁄erent demographic groups. Most
of the results are quite similar than the results for the overall sample. Especially
responses from regressions (3)-(5) are quite similar. The most interesting results are
for di⁄erent income groups. Thus we will focus on explaining them while for the other
groups we will just point out the main features. Main features of the rationality and
learning tests are reported in the Table 8. In the ￿rst two columns are result of the
test for bias (6) in the third there are results for the second test of the rationality
(8). The next three columns are reporting results for constant gain learning and
the last three for decreasing gain learning. In these results there are reported the
range of percentiles for which the variance of the explanatory variable (past forecast
error) explains more than 5% of the variance of dependent variable. The percentile
for which R2 has the highest value (and the value of R2) is reported in the middle
column and in the last column is reported the percentile with the highest estimated
coe¢ cient for respective learning and its corresponding value.
Insert Table 10 about here
This subsection also outlines some of the main di⁄erences in the responsiveness
of the percentiles of the distributions describing every demographic subgroup, along
the lines indicated by the models (3)-(5).
The comparison will be based on the observation of the partial correlation coe¢ -
cients regarding only the regressors that produce estimated coe¢ cients signi￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero. In this way we are able to discriminate which variables have a
25higher importance for some classes of agents and whether their e⁄ect has a hetero-
geneous impact on di⁄erent parts of the distribution. It is important to say that
the general features outlined for the overall sample still survive at a more disaggre-
gate level, with quantitative di⁄erences among classes within the same subgroup. As
already mentioned, the model expressed in equation (3) aims at characterising the
relevance of the determinants of the one-year-ahead in￿ ation expectations. The sec-
ond model aims at explaining what determines that change in the forecasts. It is
worth mentioning that, as in the general case, the explanatory power of the model is
quite poor. In particular, major di⁄erences between classes within the same subgroup
are con￿ned to the extreme upper end of the distribution and do not deliver a clear
picture.
The third model (5) proposed aims at providing a deeper understanding of the
determinants of the forecast error, which is assumed as dependent variable. With
regard to this model, evidence of serial correlation in the forecast error process indi-
cates that there is an ine¢ cient exploitation of information from last year￿ s forecast
in generating current year￿ s forecast, which violates a rationality criterion.
3.3.1 By gender
The ￿rst regression points out a greater importance of the in￿ ation level at the time of
forecast for men, which has a monotonic increasing impact up to the 95th percentile.
Furthermore, the autoregressive term has a greater importance for men compared to
women, even at higher percentiles. For women, this component loses importance in
favour of the forecast produced by the SPF around the 65th percentile. The evidence
can point out how women in the upper end of the distribution may rely less on their
own past forecasts.
In the third model men￿ s forecast error at the upper end of the distribution is
better described by contemporaneous changes of actual in￿ ation, while the forecast
error of the SPF acquires for them a greater importance around the median of the
distribution. The general ￿t of the model is better for men, especially for the right
half of the distribution.
3.3.2 By age group
The ￿rst regression points out a homogeneous impact of in￿ ation for younger people in
the middle range, while it gains more importance for older people at higher percentiles.
Younger people also rely less on their autoregressive term and more on the SPF
forecast.
There is substantial equivalence in the impact of the regressors for the ￿rst two
classes (18-34, 35-54). Elderly people￿ s forecast errors seem to depend less on changes
in actual in￿ ation and to be more correlated with the contemporaneous forecast error
produced by the SPF.
263.3.3 By region
There are not many di⁄erences related to a di⁄erent location: the only thing we can
point out for the ￿rst model is just that forecasts produced by people living in the
NE are more in￿ uenced by the SPF component.
In the third model, forecast errors of people from West and South in the upper
part of the distribution are accounted by changes in actual in￿ ation, while there are
not signi￿cant di⁄erences otherwise.
3.3.4 By income
Again ￿rst we have to point out that grouping interviewees by their income has started
at the end of the 1979. Thus the results are not completely comparable to the others,
but as we checked the responses to di⁄erent percentile regressions by splitting the
sample we can argue that the responses do not signi￿cantly change if we analyse
subsample of our time span. Percentile regression on di⁄erent income groups are
representing probably the most interesting results, especially due to the case of high
degree of rationality that arises from running regression (5) on the highest income
group. They are almost better forecasters that the professional forecasters.
The autoregressive component for higher percentiles gradually loses importance
as we move from the bottom income level to the top one: the last one has the general
best ￿t for the ￿rst model.
From the estimation of the third model it is clear how more upper level income
people￿ s forecast error is just described by changes in actual in￿ ation after the 70th
percentile, while the middle range is mainly described by the SPF forecast error. Its
area has a clear hump-shaped behaviour. We have to point out that the results for
(5) are signi￿cantly di⁄erent that the results for other groups or overall sample.
[more to be written more in this part]
3.3.5 By education
There are not major di⁄erences between the two upper levels of scholarisation. As
regards individuals comprised within the category ￿High School or Less￿ , we can
observe how the autoregressive component maintains a high importance at higher
percentiles.
From the estimation of the third model it is clear how upper level educated people￿ s
forecast error is just described by changes in actual in￿ ation after the 70th percentile,
while the middle range is mainly described by the SPF forecast error.
274 Decomposition of Normal Mixture by Maximum
Likelihood
The graphic analysis of the distribution of in￿ ationary expatiations clearly points
out the existence of multimodality. This characteristic constitutes one of the main
stylised facts at the root of the literature on heterogeneous expectations and on
learning mechanisms. In this section we estimate a mixture of normal distributions,
in order to characterise the heterogeneity in the forecasting process of di⁄erent groups.
This exclusively statistical approach constitutes a novelty in the literature. Branch
(2004) develops a model of expectation formation where agents form their forecasts
by rationally selecting a predictor function from a set of three costly alternatives.
The framework he employs is constituted by a mixture of three normal distributions.
However, as Pesaran and Weale (2005) point out, instead of ￿nding the parameters of
each distribution and the weight attached to each of them in every period, he imposes
strong assumptions on the choice of the models used to generate the means of each
distribution from three relatively simple speci￿cations. Our statistical approach is
aimed at estimating the mean, the variance and the proportion of each component
in the mixture. Furthermore, we do not restrict the number of components, but
we consider a sequence of nested hypotheses, testing them one by one on the basis
of the information criteria and goodness of ￿t tests20 retrievable through maximum
likelihood estimation.
4.1 Model Description and Interpretation of the Parameters
The likelihood function describing the model under scrutiny has the following form

























where ￿ is the set of model parameters and P is the total number of components in
the mixture. We denote with np the proportion of the pth Gaussian, while ￿1 and ￿2
1
are its mean and variance respectively. As we have anticipated, the estimation of the
number of components is one of the most important questions in the maximisation
20A Stata module, Denormix, developed by Stanislav Kolenikov, performs a numeric max-
imisation of the likelihood function, as well as some diagnostic tests that are useful to de-
termine the number of components. The package is freely available at the author￿ s webpage,
http://www.komkon.org/￿tacik/stata/.
28problem21. Kolenikov (2005) asserts that the likelihood ratio test has not a convenient
￿2 distribution (see McLachlan, 1987 and Feng and McCulloch, 1996). Thus we resort
to the response of goodness of ￿t tests, such as the ￿2 Pearson ￿t test. The model
yielding the highest p-value of the ￿2 test is chosen. Another remedy can be found
in the use of information criteria (Bearse et. al. (1997) and Schwarz (1978)). In this
case we choose the model that minimizes the criterion.
5 Analysis of mixed distribution estimation
5.1 Properties of the estimated distributions
In this section we analyse the cyclical properties of the parameters obtained from
the ML estimation of the mixture of normals outlined in the previous paragraph.
The aim of this analysis is to detect whether the degree of heterogeneity has some
characteristic and identi￿able temporal patterns. The decomposition of the overall
distribution in mixture of Gaussians provides us with statistical data that are relevant
for the identi￿cation of the number of subcomponents, the description of their intrinsic
characteristics and the dispersion among them.
Once we identify the number of components that determines the highest goodness
of ￿t, the ￿rst step is to observe whether this is constant over time, and in particular
over the cycle and in correspondence of periods characterised by di⁄erent levels of
uncertainty. The rise of a di⁄erent number of components, shifts in their mean or
modi￿cations in their variances with respect to phases of expansion or contraction,
point out the existence of an asymmetric response of the individuals comprised in the
sample in the process of expectation formation. For example, it might be the case that
during periods of marked uncertainty, dispersion in the sample will increase, giving
rise to additional subcomponents or to an higher variance of the existing ones. Fur-
thermore, di⁄erent individuals might resort to di⁄erent models of in￿ ation forecasting
depending on the cyclical phase.
We design a number of indices which are useful to provide preliminary evidence
on (i) the degree of dispersion, in terms of distance between the subcomponents, (ii)
concentration, measured by a Her￿ndahl-style index, (iii) convergence, in terms
of the net ￿ ow of people comprised in the distribution characterised by the lowest
forecast error, evaluated as the spread between its mean and the realised in￿ ation.
We brie￿ y present the indices employed in this part of the analysis
￿ An Her￿ndahl-type Index
The index is aimed at determining the concentration of the subcomponents of
the overall distribution, and it is give by
21On this point see, for instance, Day (1969), Hathaway (1985), Basford and McLachlan (1985),







The value of H varies between zero and one: the ￿rst case corresponds to
minimum concentration, while the second case corresponds to maximum con-
centration. For a given ￿nite number of components, the lowest value occurs in
the case of homogeneous shares.
￿ An Average Distance Index
The index is aimed at determining the average distance between the compo-
nent whose mean is a more accurate predictor of future price in￿ ation and the








where ￿mp is the di⁄erence between the mean of the pth component and the
mean of the "minium bias" component, normalised by the standard deviation
of the former.
￿ A further Dispersion Index
The following index captures the change in the sum of the dispersion of each





￿ A ￿ ￿ type Convergence Index
The index, similar to the previous one, is the sum of the dispersion of each
component weighted by its own share. A negative trend in the dynamics of the





5.1.1 Properties of overall sample
Before proceeding with the discussion we have to point out that the data retrieved
is not "ordered". It is very important how we order our results into di⁄erent time
series, since it produces signi￿cantly di⁄erent results as with ordering we can to certain
degree control properties such are variability of the mean, variance, and/or the share
30of the subdistribution. For the below ￿gures we employ the following ordering: ￿rst
we determine the distributions with the highest and the lowest mean. Then we
order the remaining distributions according how accurate are their forecasts. Thus
we determine the group that potentially could be rational. But there might arise a
situation where the group with the lowest mean is closer to the actual in￿ ation.
From the results we can argue that usually it is optimal to decompose the dis-
tribution into 5 components, although especially in the periods of stable in￿ ation 4
components or even 3 components might be optimal. In 231 periods we could de-
compose our distribution into 5 components, in 88 periods into 4 components and
in 7 periods into 3 components. Figure 19 reports the results of decomposition of
empirical distribution.
Figure 20 reports the movement of the means of di⁄erent components and Figure
21 reports their respective shares. The data here is ordered as discussed in Appendix
D.
Insert Figures 20 and 21 about here
It can be seen that the mean of the rational group is tracking the actual in￿ ation
quite well. In most periods we have one component at each tail of the distribution.
Their respective shares are usually quite low as can be observed from ￿gure 16. In
the period of stable in￿ ation the share of the "rational" group increases.
We have analysed the macroeconomics determinants that are likely to drive the
dynamics of the indices presented above, by implementing the model expressed by
equation (...) and inserting the sigma convergence index and the average distance
index as dependent variables. The empirical exercise is useful to get some insight on
the existence of some phenomenon of between/within group convergence.
As mentioned, the ￿rst index is the sum of the dispersion of each component
weighted by its own share. A negative trend in the dynamics of the index might
point out the validity of a dynamics towards a common level of dispersion, pointing
out the existence of a within group convergence. On the other way, the average
distance index is aimed at determining the average distance between the component
whose mean is a more accurate predictor of future price in￿ ation and the remaining
components. Evidence of a negative trend would be a signal of a between group
convergence. It has to be pointed out that calculated indices are invariant to any
ordering.
The analysis on the ￿rst index actually points out the possibility of a within
groups convergence process at work, as the trend has a negative coe¢ cient and,
more importantly, the cycle variable coe¢ cient is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero.
Evidence of a negative trend arises in the case of the second index as well, although
in this case the cyclical component gains some importance in explaining its variation.
[To be added more]
315.1.2 Properties of di⁄erent groups
[To be added]
5.2 Learning and convergence
5.2.1 Determination of the Demographic Structure of Each Mixture Com-
ponent
In this section we re￿ne the estimation of the proportion of each component in the
mixture of normals, by determining their demographic structure. The empirical exer-
cise we are going to outline, inspired by Branch (2004, 2005), constitutes a convenient
way to impose more structure on the data, and to obtain estimates of the demographic
composition of the shares determined in the previous step, through the unrestricted
decomposition of the mixture. We design a likelihood function for the response of
each individual, under the assumption that the forecast error, vit, with respect to the
mean of each subcomponent, Hp(￿t), is normally distributed
￿itjt￿12 ￿ Hp(￿
t) = vit ￿ N(0;￿it); p = 1;:::;P t = 1;:::;T
Given the stochastic properties of vit, the maximisation problem is consists in
max
np;￿pp2(1;:::;P)
P(￿itjt￿12; i = 1;:::;N j Hp(￿






















The estimation will provide us with valid information on accumulation of the
population of each demographic subgroup (e.g. male and female, income level, edu-
cational level) around the mean of the components of the mixture estimated in the
￿rst step for the overall sample, together with the standard deviation.
This empirical exercise should help to identify the demographic composition of
each share for the total population of respondents. The resulting information is useful
to perform both static and dynamic descriptive statistics analysis, as well as more
accurate investigation of the expectation formation process of di⁄erent demographic
subgroups over the cycle and under di⁄erent in￿ ation regimes.
[To be added more]
325.2.2 Learning and convergence within di⁄erent groups
6 Analysis of the expectation formation process
[To be added]
6.1 Digit preference?
[To be added ]
7 Survey In￿ ation Expectations in the New Key-
nesian Macro Model
In this section we design two di⁄erent exercises to test the performance of the New
Keynesian (NK) model with survey in￿ ation expectations22. Several papers have tried
to estimate the NK model with survey expectations, e.g., Roberts (1997), Rudebusch
(2002), Basdevant (2003) and Adam and Padula (2004).23 They generally conclude
that the model cannot explain the in￿ ation persistence just by including survey ex-
pectations, while ￿nding that additional lags of in￿ ation in the Phillips curve (PC)
are still signi￿cant. We reexamine this by using the results in the previous section.
The framework we are going to outline is an augmented standard version of the
NK model with heterogeneous expectations. In the ￿rst exercise we replace the for-
ward looking in￿ ation expectations with the means of subdistributions obtained from
the estimation of the mixture. We then estimate the shares of each subdistribution
and study the ￿t of the model, especially in terms of description of the in￿ ation per-
sistence. In the second exercise we also replace the shares of each subdistribution
with the shares estimated in the previous section.
The econometric approach consists of estimating a system of equations through
Hansen￿ s (1982) Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. For the sake of
comparison, we also report the results of ML and OLS estimators. We use lagged
values of the dependant variables as instruments24. The model employed is derived
in Flamini and Pfajfar (2005). The main features of the model are the aggregate
demand, which is predetermined for 2 quarters, and the Phillips curve, which is
predetermined for 4 quarters. Furthermore, the demand function is derived under
the assumption that part of the consumption goods are employed in the production
process
22Before proceeding in the analysis, we transform the frequency of the data estimated in the
previous section from monthly to quarterly (as average of the quarter).
23These authors use survey in￿ ation expectations for US, Euro area, and New Zealand. Paloviita
(2002) pursues a di⁄erent approach by using OECD forecasts of in￿ ation and output for the Euro
area.
24Data de￿nitions are in the appendix A2.
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388 Tables and ￿gures
Table 1:
Demographic Group Mean Median Variance Int. Range Skew Kurt Inflation
Male 4.28 3.8 20.6 4.44 1.79 8.69
Female 5.37 4.16 34.9 5.55 1.54 5.6
18-34 5.14 4.16 29.5 4.93 1.64 6.52
35-54 4.95 4.09 27.6 4.81 1.72 7.12
55+ 4.48 3.46 28.1 4.9 1.69 6.71
West 4.91 4.09 27.1 4.89 1.61 6.69
North/Centre 4.77 3.9 27.6 4.79 1.73 7.1
North/East 4.82 3.92 28.9 5.09 1.61 6.54
South 4.95 3.94 30.2 4.99 1.66 6.41
Bottom Income Level 5.28 3.95 36.7 5.83 1.44 5.08
Middle Income Level 4.59 3.71 26.8 4.71 1.79 7.36
Top Income Level 4.01 3.57 19.2 4.29 1.9 9.41
HS or less 5.23 3.97 34.8 5.43 1.53 5.47
Some college 4.78 3.96 26.4 4.77 1.66 6.97
College degree 4.51 4.11 20 4.27 1.79 8.95
Overall 4.87 4.16 28.7 5.55 1.73 6.98
4.19
Table 2:
Demographic Group Mean Mean SSE Median Median SSE Inflation
Male 4.28 741 3.8 849
Female 5.37 1474 4.16 1089
18-34 5.14 1143 4.16 900
35-54 4.95 1035 4.09 810
55+ 4.48 1253 3.46 1560
West 4.91 1021 4.09 834
North/Centre 4.77 1021 3.9 1030
North/East 4.82 1115 3.92 1106
South 4.95 1174 3.94 1033
Bottom Income Level 5.28 1610 3.95 772
Middle Income Level 4.59 834 3.71 507
Top Income Level 4.01 431 3.57 392
HS or less 5.23 1420 3.97 1183
Some college 4.78 1012 3.96 980
College degree 4.51 759 4.11 745
Overall 4.87 1015 4.16 1089
4.19
39Table 3:
Demographic Group Mean Median Variance Int. Range Skew Kurt Inflation
Male 5.64 5.05 29.7 5.77 1.41 6.38
Female 6.65 5.15 46.6 7.58 1.18 4.02
18-34 6.78 5.56 40.5 6.48 1.25 4.57
35-54 6.41 5.37 37.8 6.36 1.32 5.19
55+ 5.27 4 37.2 6.37 1.4 5.32
West 6.33 5.4 37.2 6.43 1.26 5.15
North/Centre 6 4.92 37.9 6.39 1.36 5.19
North/East 6.27 5.13 40.3 6.75 1.27 4.69
South 6.18 4.99 40.7 6.58 1.32 4.81
Bottom Income Level 6.12 4.46 48.6 7.8 1.22 4.02
Middle Income Level 5.7 4.6 37.2 6.27 1.46 5.49
Top Income Level 5.28 4.73 28.9 5.7 1.48 6.6
HS or less 6.29 4.77 45.4 7.19 1.25 4.24
Some college 6.08 5.11 35.7 6.18 1.34 5.34
College degree 6.12 5.71 28.2 5.38 1.3 6.19
Overall 6.18 5.15 39.3 7.58 1.33 4.96
6.2
Table 4:
Demographic Group Mean Median Variance Int. Range Skew Kurt Inflation
Male 3.36 2.94 14.5 3.54 2.05 10.26
Female 4.5 3.49 27 4.17 1.78 6.68
18-34 4.03 3.21 22 3.89 1.91 7.85
35-54 3.95 3.22 20.7 3.76 1.99 8.42
55+ 3.94 3.09 22 3.9 1.88 7.65
West 3.94 3.19 20.3 3.83 1.85 7.74
North/Centre 3.93 3.21 20.6 3.7 1.98 8.39
North/East 3.84 3.09 21.2 3.96 1.84 7.79
South 4.11 3.22 23.1 3.91 1.89 7.5
Bottom Income Level 4.81 3.65 29.9 4.7 1.57 5.69
Middle Income Level 3.95 3.2 20.8 3.82 1.98 8.43
Top Income Level 3.27 2.9 13.6 3.48 2.13 11.02
HS or less 4.51 3.42 27.6 4.24 1.72 6.31
Some college 3.89 3.18 20.1 3.81 1.88 8.08
College degree 3.42 3.03 14.5 3.51 2.12 10.82
Overall 3.98 3.49 21.6 4.17 2.01 8.35
2.98
40Table 7:
Percentile α0 α1 α5 α11 α12 adj R
2
DW LM
5 -0.09473 -0.01145 0.10487 0.661447 -0.005838 0.590783 1.86518 3.419019
-1.125544 -0.446112 3.864332 14.81215 -0.141948
0 0.000622 0.093356 0.501669 0.000592
20 0.126709 0.007963 0.038741 0.825245 -0.011359 0.783729 2.108067 1.241417
1.953621 0.382037 2.238046 25.62935 -0.3611
0 0.012736 0.023533 0.758311 -0.007968
35 0.414404 0.111881 0.078971 0.692024 -0.054613 0.811333 2.085508 10.78214
4.118989 3.463982 3.067221 16.27749 -1.223784
0 0.207533 0.029997 0.631416 -0.055098
50 0.643896 0.142411 0.052998 0.641576 0.028623 0.883729 2.090109 1.599532
5.453873 4.041255 2.100157 14.24378 0.623681
0 0.234476 0.009356 0.614024 0.027424
65 0.597332 0.140803 0.013555 0.767223 -0.00221 0.959869 2.20107 5.629957
5.67896 4.616663 0.724973 20.20503 -0.064008
0 0.194938 0.001289 0.765969 -0.001791
80 0.829583 0.221726 -0.018074 0.574501 0.266797 0.926136 2.170334 20.81655
5.35557 4.668941 -0.494793 12.41056 3.710707
0 0.21286 -0.000767 0.557264 0.157764
95 4.922529 0.30972 -0.112973 0.378513 0.727935 0.884826 2.073057 5.272365
10.51711 4.295885 -1.833474 7.054447 5.674966
0 0.215654 -0.002423 0.351977 0.321154
Table 8:
Percentile β 0 β1 β4 β5 β6 β10 adj R
2
DW LM
5 0.021859 -0.005743 0.025232 0.049844 0.817661 -0.013736 0.744347 2.002395 1.546538
0.371232 -0.558999 0.423693 2.688042 13.81945 -0.335997
0 -0.000336 0.01775 0.055185 0.678658 -0.002705
20 0.07958 -0.031382 0.082998 0.033491 0.831623 -0.030514 0.85678 1.95855 5.297139
2.075881 -3.376631 1.418898 2.818029 14.71095 -1.080296
0 0.019337 0.066222 0.027191 0.748616 -0.002231
35 0.043559 -0.029567 0.176302 0.039439 0.720604 0.074932 0.786758 1.987575 0.297668
0.934461 -1.791201 2.973088 2.301914 12.51742 1.528925
0 -0.005047 0.130957 0.028763 0.609267 0.026326
50 -0.009211 -0.016224 0.210276 0.03232 0.733404 0.072917 0.819273 2.037169 5.649271
-0.25824 -0.712788 3.508346 1.813141 12.99337 1.40703
0 -0.007853 0.159673 0.015974 0.633335 0.021116
65 -0.032842 -0.020933 0.222331 0.010812 0.748923 0.111278 0.892344 1.996421 4.886389
-1.001481 -0.929733 3.676228 0.848683 13.37323 2.325793
0 -0.014367 0.17827 0.005332 0.673895 0.050984
80 0.434589 0.180954 0.211123 0.029217 0.552788 0.087704 0.793901 1.906255 9.317524
3.305049 3.655734 3.532268 1.192772 9.566334 1.050179
0 0.154989 0.154948 0.006915 0.456531 0.023909
95 2.592649 0.247461 0.203516 0.015123 0.434981 0.20605 0.728849 2.018644 3.853632
4.738284 4.835443 3.604924 0.370143 7.71224 1.665398
0 0.199175 0.15013 0.001599 0.349341 0.033063
41Table 9:
Percentile γ0 γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 γ5 adj R
2
DW LM
5 0.724896 0.830685 -0.212333 -0.011714 0.410927 0.568801 0.913086 0.876929 96.00554
5.767167 31.09996 -9.282281 -0.350267 7.493298 9.842804
0 0.739137 0.001195 0.000887 0.160839 0.012453
20 0.377044 0.88218 -0.109709 0.039082 0.291533 0.544748 0.877859 0.484068 177.1469
3.598453 28.69231 -5.047493 1.231526 6.057569 10.19863
0 0.749382 -0.005299 -0.00375 0.131293 0.008235
35 0.53637 0.713859 -0.130196 0.05539 0.234986 0.530016 0.736719 0.661733 141.0765
5.702844 15.31129 -4.846561 1.431296 3.631449 7.897191
0 0.484395 -0.004798 -0.00693 0.14764 0.120729
50 0.098423 0.212925 -0.033953 0.060264 0.493078 0.173569 0.620452 0.526092 168.8809
1.984261 3.633577 -1.33278 1.652009 6.883843 2.502988
0 0.09868 -0.004153 -0.014114 0.448939 0.097322
65 -0.888195 0.219273 -0.005963 0.055606 0.253756 0.427515 0.751401 0.534202 167.7825
-14.1763 5.283664 -0.326761 2.103352 5.49416 10.61973
0 0.070305 -0.001293 -0.018546 0.268237 0.436772
80 -1.957707 0.235571 -8.12E-05 0.010553 0.05723 0.815214 0.702703 0.88426 100.8469
-16.61696 6.522812 -0.002851 0.252221 1.076451 17.48691
0 0.047348 -1.15E-05 -0.002567 0.032803 0.630004
95 -7.059817 0.32647 0.046956 0.107927 -0.321297 1.240188 0.618541 1.112078 67.12759
-16.67411 8.625145 1.006713 1.582705 -3.971579 17.93305
0 0.11527 0.004719 -0.011237 -0.086966 0.603009
Table 10:
group α=0 (1%) α=0 (5%) a=0,b=1 CGL* CGL peak mCGL coef. DGL* DGL peak mDGL coef.
male 54-58 55-58 never 44-99 75 (37%) 62 (0.50) 42-94 76 (77%) 77 (37)
female 50-53 50-53 never 42-97 71 (34%) 58 (0.37) 43-87 68 (69%) 70 (30)
18-34 50-54 51-54 never 36-97 66 (39%) 55 (0.53) 36-87 68 (72%) 70 (32)
35-54 51-54 51-54 never 40-98 72 (38%) 57 (0.47) 40-92 70 (72%) 72 (33)
55-97 56-60 57-60 never 54-98 78 (27%) 78 (0.35) 52-94 76 (57%) 79 (36)
West 51-54 51-54 never 39-98 62 (39%) 55 (0.56) 39-92 70 (74%) 71 (35)
Nort-centr. 52-56 53-56 never 44-98 76 (30%) 61 (0.40) 44-90 72 (60%) 73 (34)
Northeast 52-56 53-56 never 42-98 64 (34%) 60 (0.50) 43-91 70 (59%) 75 (33)
South 52-56 53-55 never 42-98 73 (35%) 59 (0.40) 43-90 72 (65%) 73 (32)
Bottom 48-53 49-52 never 60-97 71 (26%) 72 (0.29) 17-31, 58-95 67 (50%) 64 (39)
Middle 51-55 52-55 never 48-98 75 (38%) 77 (0.33) 14-33, 57-97 71 (65%) 62 (47)
Top 53-58 54-57 never 50-99 81 (43%) 58 (0.51) 12-34, 54-98 76 (71%) 61 (51)
HS or less 51-55 52-55 never 48-96 73 (30%) 73 (0.31) 47-89 71 (66%) 72 (32)
Some coll. 52-56 53-55 never 40-98 72 (35%) 57 (0.53) 40-91 73 (67%) 74 (33)
Coll. degree 51-55 52-54 never 35-99 64 (43%) 56 (0.60) 35-94 73 (74%) 75 (36)
Overall sample 51-55 52-53 never 44-98 74 (35%) 59 (0.42) 42-90 72 (75%) 73 (33)
* R^2 above 5%
Table 11:
42Constant Cycle Inflation AR(1) SX abs error lag abs error R^2 DW
Model for 0% 9.433 -0.349 -0.170 0.761 -0.283 - - 0.740 2.143
6.214 -2.303 -2.426 22.593 -4.568
Model for 5% 19.848 - - 0.131 -0.139 -1.058 -0.153 0.640 1.967
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48Figure 12:




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































549 Appendix A: Figures across demographic sub-






























































































































































































































































































































































6010 Appendix B: Percentile time series analysis
11 Appendix C: Moments regressions
Table C1:
1st Model-pre1988 Constant Trend AR(1) Cycle Inflation Term Str R^2 DW
Interquantile Range 2.415 -0.010 0.604 -0.045 0.180 0.051 0.782 2.288
2.994 -1.830 8.893 -0.487 2.716 0.464
Variance 15.219 -0.035 0.415 -0.629 1.595 0.055 0.824 2.053
4.447 -1.675 5.451 -1.558 4.732 0.120
Skewness 0.908 0.004 0.345 0.007 -0.057 0.028 0.943 2.061
6.367 5.942 4.358 0.727 -5.696 2.285
Kurtosis 2.433 0.015 0.496 -0.015 -0.140 -0.032 0.895 2.079
4.621 4.629 6.889 -0.313 -3.705 -0.555
2nd Model-pre1988
AR(1) Cycle Inflation Term Str R^2 DW
Interquantile Range 0.371 0.004 0.234 -0.039 0.349 2.149
4.389 0.054 3.536 -0.433
Variance 0.223 -0.806 2.105 -0.874 0.559 2.010
2.552 -2.488 6.131 -2.344
Skewness 0.323 0.012 -0.058 0.043 0.631 2.093
3.719 1.328 -5.336 3.672
Kurtosis 0.448 -0.019 -0.132 0.041 0.458 2.093
5.436 -0.472 -3.425 0.840
61Table C2:
1st Model-post1988 Constant Trend AR(1) Cycle Inflation Term Str R^2 DW
Interquantile Range 2.201 -0.001 -0.155 0.215 0.124 0.307 0.392 2.083
4.604 -0.655 -3.289 3.454 2.585 4.376
Variance 12.122 -0.026 -0.610 2.122 0.894 0.350 0.717 2.042
4.650 -3.882 -2.445 5.765 3.449 5.143
Skewness 2.061 -0.001 0.034 -0.109 -0.044 0.313 0.335 2.152
8.094 -2.854 2.085 -4.607 -2.594 4.494
Kurtosis 11.454 -0.002 0.248 -0.923 -0.422 0.109 0.445 1.946
9.332 -1.002 2.833 -6.818 -4.413 1.489
2nd Model-post1988
AR(1) Cycle Inflation Term Str R^2 DW
Interquantile Range -0.121 0.223 0.106 0.313 0.224 2.065
-2.668 2.823 1.549 4.493
Variance -0.700 2.893 0.808 0.278 0.416 2.006
-3.114 6.663 2.421 4.117
Skewness 0.025 -0.050 -0.015 0.243 0.115 2.068
1.842 -2.071 -0.728 3.405
Kurtosis 0.188 -0.608 -0.184 0.141 0.168 1.955
2.489 -4.356 -1.573 1.952
62